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Abstract
The paper explains the observed asymmetric inflation response to value-added tax (VAT)
changes in Hungary by calibrating a standard sectoral menu cost model on a new micro-level
CPI data set. The model is able to reproduce important moments of the data, and finds that
the asymmetry can be explained by the interaction of menu costs, (sectoral) trend inflation
and forward-looking firms, thereby it provides direct evidence to the argument of Ball and
Mankiw (1994).
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Menüköltségek és inflációs aszimmetria
Elemzés mikroadatokon
Karádi Péter - Reiff Ádám
Összefoglaló
A tanulmány a hazai általános forgalmi adó változások aszimmetrikus inflációs hatását
magyarázza meg egy szektorszintű menüköltség modell felhasználásával. A modell költséges
árváltoztatást és jelentős mértékű termékszintű sokkokat tételez fel, és ezáltal sikeresen
reprodukálja a termékszintű áradatokban megfigyelt árváltoztatási gyakoriságot és az
árváltoztatások átlagos méretét is. A tanulmány alapvető megállapítása, hogy az
aszimmetriát elsősorban a pozitív szektorszintű trend infláció okozza: az előretekintő cégek
nemcsak az adóváltozás közvetlen hatását, hanem a várható szektorszintű infláció hatásait is
érvényesítik az áraikban, ami nagyobb pozitív és kisebb negatív inflációs hatást eredményez.
A tanulmány így közvetlen bizonyítékkal szolgál Ball és Mankiw (1994) elméleti érveléséhez.
Tárgyszavak:
Menüköltség, Inflációs aszimmetria, Szektorális heterogenitás, Általános forgalmi adó
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Abstract
The paper explains the observed asymmetric inflation response to value-added tax
(VAT) changes in Hungary by calibrating a standard sectoral menu cost model on a new
micro-level CPI data set. The model is able to reproduce important moments of the
data, and finds that the asymmetry can be explained by the interaction of menu costs,
(sectoral) trend inflation and forward looking firms, thereby it provides direct evidence
to the argument of Ball and Mankiw (1994).
Keywords: Menu Cost, Inflation Asymmetry, Sectoral Heterogeneity, Value-
Added Tax
JEL Classification: E30
1 Introduction
Asymmetric inflation response to symmetric aggregate shocks is an important indirect evi-
dence supporting models with sticky prices. While standard frictionless, flexible price models
do not explain it, asymmetry is a straightforward prediction of sticky price models with pos-
itive trend inflation. The reason of this, as it was first argued by Ball and Mankiw, 1994, is
that forward looking firms setting their prices for several periods will incorporate the effects
of the positive trend inflation; they are going to be more responsive and be willing to change
their prices by a larger absolute magnitude for a positive shock than to negative one. 1
∗Work in progress, comments are welcome. The authors would like to thank Peter Benczur, Laszlo Halpern,
Attila Ratfai and seminar participants at the Summer Workshop of the Institute of Economics, Hungarian
Academy of Sciences and the National Bank of Hungary for insightful comments. All errors remain ours.
The views expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Bank
of Hungary.
†peter.karadi@nyu.edu, PhD candidate, New York University, 19 W 4th Street, NY, NY, 10003
‡reiffa@mnb.hu, Central Bank of Hungary, Szabadsag ter 8-9, Budapest, H-1053, Hungary.
1In a similar framework, Devereux and Siu, 2007 provide a different argument for asymmetry by showing
that individual firms’ strategic incentives are asymmetric: while prices are strategic complements in case of
positive aggregate shocks to the (nominal) marginal cost, they are strategic substitutes in case of negative
shocks. This strategic asymmetry is found to be larger with more intense competition (higher elasticity of
substitution parameter θ). In their result, however, the asymmetry is of third-order and, in our simulations,
even with relatively high elasticity of substitution parameter θ = 11, the 4% tax changes were not large
enough to make this effect significant (zero inflation rate still implied symmetric inflation responses).
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The paper sets out to examine the asymmetry on a new comprehensive CPI data set of
Hungary, capitalizing on the natural experiment provided by the two major value added tax
(VAT) increases and a major tax decrease between 2004 and 2006.2 These VAT shocks provide
exceptional information about the pricing behavior of firms3, as these exogenous cost push
shocks influence a large number of firms simultaneously in an easily measurable way. Gabriel
and Reiff, 2007 using the same data set found that the shocks had asymmetric aggregate
inflation effect (see Figure 1). According to the estimates, while the 2006 September 5%-
points increase of the 15% VAT rate4 increased the sample CPI by 2.13%, the 2006 January
5%-points decrease of the 25% VAT rate5 decreased the CPI only by 0.92%. The asymmetry
is even more pronounced in the subsamples of products directly affected by the tax changes:
their average price increase was 3.73% for the VAT increase and only -1.24% for the VAT
decrease.
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Figure 1: Monthly inflation rates and VAT rate changes (sample averages)
The paper calibrates a standard sectoral menu cost model of Klenow and Willis, 2007
with idiosyncratic shocks to reproduce important moments of the data, like inflation rate
(Figure 1), the fraction of price changing firms (see Figure 2 later) and magnitude of price
changes (see Figure 3 later), and examines whether the asymmetry implied by the model is
in line with that observed in the data.
Menu cost models assume that firms face a small fixed cost for changing their prices
2In this version of the paper, we are going to concentrate on the 2006 January 5% points tax decrease and
the 2006 September 5% points tax increase.
3Especially in Hungary, where most sectors quote gross prices.
4Influencing 46.9% of the products in our sample.
5Influencing another 51%.
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implying lumpy price adjustments in line with direct price-spell observations: prices, in
general, are constant for many months (the average duration of a price spell in Hungary is
9.5 months). Adding idiosyncratic technology shocks to the model, as suggested by Golosov
and Lucas, 2003, is necessary to explain the average size of price changes, which are much
higher (11.5% in our sample) than that justified by the average inflation rate (3.9%).
The application of a ’state-dependent’ menu cost model is also justified by the develop-
ment of the fraction of price-changing firms (see Figure 2 later). Standard ’time-dependent’,
Calvo-style models assume exogenous probability of price changes, and even though this
would be in line with the relatively constant frequency of price changing firms in ’normal’
months (12% in our sample), it would be unable to account for the increased frequency of
price changing firms at the months of VAT shocks clearly observable in the data (31.4%).
The paper differentiates among major sectors in the economy and uses different calibra-
tions for each of them. We can observe substantial heterogeneity both in terms of inflation
rates and the level of price-stickiness among sectors, and as firms can be expected to pay
more attention to the sectoral price developments where most of their competitors are, using
a sectoral model is more appropriate. Furthermore, this choice allows us to control for the
different sectoral composition of the observed tax changes. The VAT increases and the de-
crease affected various sectors differently, the VAT increase hitting sectors with more flexible
prices disproportionally, providing some explanation for the observed asymmetry.
Though some arguments might be given that menu costs or (the logarithm of) idiosyn-
cratic productivity shocks are asymmetric, this paper does not assume any asymmetry in the
micro level. Neither the narrow definition of menu costs as the physical costs of changing
a price nor a broader definition as information collection and decision costs would imply
asymmetric costs for a price increase or a price decrease.6
The model is able to hit important moments of the data. By setting reasonable parameter
values the model is able to hit both the average frequency and the magnitude of the price
changes. Furthermore, the model has no problem reproducing the stylized fact that price
increases are usually more frequent but smaller than price decreases, contrary to the original
Ball and Mankiw, 1994 model which predicted more frequent, and larger price increases.
The reason of the difference is that while Ball and Mankiw, 1994 assume symmetric profit
functions, the standard constant elasticity of substitution (CES) utility function results in
asymmetric profit and value functions. The asymmetry comes from the fact that lower
relative price implies higher demand, so higher relative losses from a suboptimal price. As a
result of this asymmetry, the firms are going to be more sensitive to their relative price being
smaller than the optimal than when it is higher, and be ready to make smaller upward price
adjustments.
The observed VAT shocks not just increased the fraction of price changing firms, but also
decreased the average size of the price changes (see Figures 2 and 3). A standard model
with homogeneous menu costs can not quantitatively explain this stylized fact, even though
standard channels in menu costs models can give some explanation for the sign of these
6The introduction of sales, however, might give some justification to asymmetric menu costs. Midrigan
and Kehoe, 2007 endogenize sales choice by assuming that the firms can choose to decrease the price of their
product temporarily for a lower than normal menu cost, and show that their model can reproduce impor-
tant characteristics of sales observed their micro-level data. It should be noted, though, that they increase
downward flexibility on the micro-level influencing results contrary to the macro-evidence of downward price
rigidity. Our model disregards sales and we filter it out from our data as well.
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effects, especially if we consider that VAT shocks can be considered more persistent than
other cost shocks justifying a lower threshold for price changes. The paper finds, however,
that a lower menu cost at the months of VAT changes can reproduce both the frequency and
the magnitude of price changes observed in the data. This fact might suggest that a (not
explicitly modeled) more general definition of menu cost might be justified including not just
physical costs – which are the same for any shocks –, but information collecting and decision
making costs as well, which can be expected to be lower for the widely publicized, substantial
and easily measurable VAT shock.
The main finding of the paper is that a sectoral menu cost model calibrated to hit the
mean sectoral inflation rate and the level of price stickiness observable in the data can fully
account for the sectoral asymmetry observed in the data for both of the two examined sectors
in Hungary.7 The paper also shows that a non-sectoral version of the model hitting the
average inflation rate and the average level of price stickiness underestimates the asymmetry
in the inflation responses underlining the necessity of a sectoral model to be able to explain
the observed asymmetry.
There is a long line of research documenting asymmetric price developments to monetary
and cost shocks using aggregate (see e.g. Cover, 1992, Ravn and Sola, 2004) and sectoral
data (Peltzman, 2000) in reduced form estimations. Our paper is the first we know of, how-
ever, which uses VAT shocks to analyze the effects of the asymmetry, which is arguably a
more easily measurable and identifiable shock than those used by the previous papers. The
main contribution of the paper, is to calibrate a menu cost model using the detailed and
comprehensive micro-level pricing data of Hungary, and to show that (sectoral) trend infla-
tions can fully account for the observed asymmetry. As standard frictionless, flexible price
models would have difficulty in explaining these asymmetries, our paper is also a contribution
to the growing literature using natural experiments – like the effect of euro introduction to
restaurant prices in Hobijn, Ravenna and Tambalotti, 2006 – and special environments – like
the high inflation episodes in Mexico in Gagnon, 2007 – to provide evidence to the validity
of the sticky price assumptions in general and menu cost models in particular.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model, solves for the flexible
price case and explains the numerical algorithm used for the solution in case of positive menu
costs. Section 3 presents the data and the moments the paper is about to match, and presents
some stylized facts the data suggests. Section 4 presents the results for the non-sectoral and
the sectoral calibrations and section 5 concludes.
2 The Model
The paper uses a version of Klenow and Willis, 2006 sectoral menu cost model with standard
monopolistic competition and CES preferences. The model assumes no aggregate nominal un-
certainty by considering exogenously given nominal aggregate output growth (consistent with
a nominal income targeting policy) and assumes unit elasticity of substitution between sec-
toral aggregates implying constant nominal expenditure growth on the sectoral level as well.
Though this assumption is somewhat restrictive, it makes the model much more tractable,
7The analyzed processed food and services sector – the two largest – were hit by both the tax increases
and the tax decrease.
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and allows us to concentrate on the endogenous inflation response to aggregate shock we are
mostly interested in.
In order to realistically capture the effects of the VAT shocks, the paper introduces two
distinct value added tax rates8 into the model, and considers two types of firms in each sector
producing (imperfect) substitute products, but facing different tax rates.
The model assumes that the firms determine correct linear beliefs about the development
of the endogenous sectoral state variables as is assumed in Krusell and Smith, 1998, and it
is going to be solved numerically by value function iteration over a discretized state space.
2.1 The consumer
The representative consumer is assumed to maximize the expected present value of his utility
max
{Csi(t),Ls(t),M(t)}
E
∞∑
t=0
βt
(
log
[
C(t) ·
(
M(t)
P (t)
)ν]
−
S∑
s=1
µs
1 + ψs
Ls(t)1+ψs
)
, (1)
where the aggregate C(t) and sectoral consumptions Cs(t) are determined by
C(t) =
S∏
s=1
(
Cs(t)
αs
)αs
, Cs(t) =
(
ns∑
i=1
n
− 1θs
s Csi(t)
θs−1
θs
) θs
θs−1
with sector-specific elasticities of substitution θs. The consumer is assumed to supply sector
specific labor Ls, s = 1, . . . , S, and obtain utility from holding real money balances (M/P ).
The consumer’s periodic budget constraint is given by
S∑
s=1
ns∑
i=1
Psi(t)Csi(t)+
∑
B(t+1)+M(t+1) = R(t)B(t)+M(t)+
S∑
s=1
w˜s(t)Ls+Π˜(t)+T (t), (2)
where Psi(t) is the gross price, B(t) is a state dependent nominal asset (nominal Arrow-
security) with state dependent gross return R(t), M(t) is the nominal money balance and
T (t) is a lump-sum transfer.
Let the aggregate P (t) and the sectoral price level be given by
P (t) =
S∏
s=1
Ps(t)αs , Ps(t) =
(
ns∑
i=1
Psi(t)1−θs
ns
) 1
1−θs
.
The consumer optimization implies that he will spend a constant αs fraction of his nominal
expenditures on the sectoral composite good, with his demand for it is given by
Cs(t) = αs
(
Ps(t)
P (t)
)−1
C(t), (3)
and his demand for individual good i from sector s is given by
Csi(t) =
1
ns
(
Psi(t)
Ps(t)
)−θs
Cs(t) =
αs
ns
(
Psi(t)
Ps(t)
)−θs (Ps
P
)−1
C(t). (4)
8In our model without product inputs, value added tax and sales tax are equivalent.
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The Euler equation of the consumer implies that the stochastic discount factor 1R(t+1) is
given by
1
R(t+ 1)
= β
P (t)C(t)
P (t+ 1)C(t+ 1)
. (5)
The labor supply equation in each sector s = 1, . . . , S is given by
µsLs(t)ψsC(t) =
w˜(t)
P (t)
. (6)
The money demand equation is going to be
M(t)
P (t)
= νC(t)
i(t) + 1
i(t)
, (7)
where i(t) is the nominal interest rate.
2.2 The government and the central bank
Denote τsi(t) the value added tax (VAT) in sector s for good i. The log gross tax rates are
assumed to follow a finite state Markov process, with transition probabilities P j , j = 1, 2
implying persistent tax changes. The government is assumed to maintain a balanced budget
every period:9
S∑
s=1
ns∑
i=1
Psi(t)
τsi(t)
1 + τsi(t)
Csi(t) = T g(t). (8)
The central bank is assumed to follow a nominal income targeting rule by maintaining a
predetermined growth rate of the nominal aggregate output. The resulting extra money
supply M(t) in the economy is redistributed in a lump sum way
M(t)−M(t− 1) = Tm(t), (9)
where Tm(t) + T g(t) = T (t) the total transfer to the consumers.
2.3 The firms
The firms are maximizing the present value of their profits facing a small menu cost for
changing their gross prices. We denote this cost φ˜(t) = φ(t)P (t)Y (t)n , and, for analytical
convenience, we assume that it is proportional to their revenue. We also allow this menu cost
to be smaller for tax shocks than in case of a more general shock. Our reasoning is that tax
shocks are widely publicized, easily measurable and sizeable cost shocks, so – even though the
physical costs of changing prices are the same – the firms can be expected to spend less on
informing consumers (and competitors) about the reasons of the price changes, on collecting
information and making decisions.
In each sector, we distinguish two types of firms: there are n1s number of firms with tax
rate τ1 and n2s = ns−n1s number of firms with tax rate τ2. By this, we are modeling the fact
9If the net prices Pn are taxed by τ VAT, then the gross price is P = (1 + τ)Pn, so the tax revenue equals
τPnC = τ
1+τ
PC.
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that firms face different VAT tax levels and the changes influenced only a subset of firms in
each sector.
We assume that the firms use only labor to produce their differentiated good i in sector
s and face idiosyncratic shocks Asi and sectoral technology shocks Zs. The production
functions of the firms are given by
Y jsi(t) = Zs(t)Asi(t)L
j
si(t)
η. (10)
The growth rate of the sectoral productivity gZs(t+1) = log(Zs(t+1))−log(Zs(t)) is assumed
to follow a first order autoregressive process
gZs(t+ 1)− µgZs = ρgZs (gZs(t)− µgZs) + gZs(t+ 1), (11)
where Z(t) ∼ N(0, σ2gZs) is a white noise growth shock. Similarly, the idiosyncratic produc-
tivity logAsi(t) is a first order autoregressive process:
logAsi(t+ 1) = ρAs logAsi(t) + Asi(t+ 1), (12)
where Asi(t) ∼ N(0, σ2As) is a white noise shock, and is independent of gZ (t).
This production function (10) implies an individual labor demand
Ljsi(t) =
(
Y jsi(t)
Zs(t)Asi(t)
) 1
η
, (13)
which aggregates to a sectoral labor demand given by
Ls(t) =
n1s∑
i=1
L1si(t) +
ns∑
i=n1s+1
L2si(t). (14)
Each firm in sector s, producing good i and facing tax rate τ js is assumed to maximize
the expected discounted present value of their profits
maxE
∞∑
t=0
1∏t
q=0R(q)
Π˜jsi(t), (15)
where the periodic profit level is given by
Π˜jsi(t) =
1
1 + τ js (t)
P jsi(t)Y
j
si(t)− w˜(t)
(
Y jsi(t)
Zs(t)Asi(t)
) 1
η
. (16)
Using the fact that in equilibrium the demand Y jsi = C
j
si, equation (4) implies
Π˜jsi(t) =
1
1 + τ js (t)
1
ns
P jsi(t)
(
P jsi(t)
Ps(t)
)−θs
Ys(t)− w˜(t)
 1ns
(
P jsi(t)
Ps(t)
)−θs
Ys(t)
Zs(t)Asi(t)

1
η
. (17)
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We are going to normalize the profit level by the average sectoral revenues
Πjsi(t) =
Π˜jsi(t)ns
αsP (t)Y (t)
, (18)
where we used equation (3) implying constant proportions of sectoral expenditures given by
αsP (t)Y (t). Let p
j
si(t) =
P jsi
Ps(t)
be the sectoral relative price, w(t) = w˜(t)P (t)Y (t) the normalized
wage rate, and φ(t) =
˜φ(t)ns
αsP (t)Y (t)
the normalized menu cost. Let ζ(t) = w(t)
(
nη−1s Ys(t)
Zs(t)
) 1
η
be a sectoral cost factor. Substituting these variables into the normalized periodic profit
function we get that
Πjsi(p
j
i (t), Ai(t), ζ(t), τ
j(t)) =
1
1 + τ j(t)
(
pjsi
)1−θs − (pjsi(t))− θsη ζs(t)Asi(t)− 1η − φ(t). (19)
Firms are assumed to know the current values of both the current exogenous state
variables (Asi(t), gZs(t), τ1(t), τ2(t), φ(t)) and endogenous state variables (pis(t), ζs(t),Γs(t)),
where pis(t) is the sectoral inflation rate and Γs(t) is the distribution of prices, when making
their decision about their current price, and assumed to satisfy all demand on this price. The
state variables of the system are denoted by (pjis,−1,Ωis), where Ωis = (Asi, pis, ζs, gZs, τ
1, τ2, φ,Γs).
Let the value function of the firms be
V j
(
pjis,−1,Ωsi
)
= max
{C,NC}
(
V NC,j
(
pjis,−1,Ωis
)
, V C,j
(
pjis,−1,Ωis
))
, (20)
where the value function in case of no price change (NC) is given by
V NC,j
(
pjis,−1,Ωis
)
= Πjsi
(
pjsi,−1
1 + pis
, Asi, ζs, τ
j
s
)
+ E
1
R
V
(
psi,−1
1 + pis
,Ω′si
)
(21)
and the value function in case of price change is given by
V C,j
(
pjis,−1,Ωis
)
= max
pjsi
Πjsi(p
j
is, Asi, ζs, τ
j
s ) + E
1
R
V (psi,Ω′is) . (22)
The next period sectoral distribution of prices Γs(t+ 1) is, in general, a very complicated
function of the last period price distribution Γs(t) and the current distribution of the sectoral
idiosyncratic technology distribution Λs(t + 1) and the development of the exogenous state
variables gZs(t+ 1), τ1(t+ 1), τ2(t+ 1), φ(t+ 1):
Γs(t+ 1) = Θ(Γs(t),Λs(t+ 1), gZs(t+1), τ1(t+ 1), τ2(t+ 1), φ(t+ 1)) (23)
2.4 The equilibrium
We consider a closed economy dynamic general equilibrium with deterministic nominal growth
rate and firms forming linear forecasts about the future values of the aggregate endogenous
state variables in the spirit of Krusell and Smith, 1998. The equilibrium requires
8
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1. The representative consumer maximizes his utility function (1) given his budget con-
straint (2) taking goods prices {Pis(t)}, the interest rates R(t) and the sectoral wages
{ws} as given.
2. The firms are assumed to maximize their value function (20), (21), (22) knowing the
current values of the state variables and correctly predicting the development of the
idiosyncratic shock (12), the sectoral technology shock (11), the taxes and the menu
costs.
Following Krusell and Smith, 1998, we assume that the firms – instead of calculating
the whole next period distribution of prices given by equation (23) predict only the
inflation rate – the aggregate moment they are interested in – using a linear equation:
pifs (t+ 1) = γ1 + γ2pis(t) + γ3ζs(t) + γ4gZs(t)+
γ5g
+
τ¯ (t+ 1) + γ6g
−
τ¯ (t+ 1) + pi, pi ∼ N(0, σpi ) (24)
containing all the current sectoral state variables. The equation also contains the next
period increase/decrease of the average tax rates g±τ¯ . Although, we do not assume
the firms having information about the next period tax rates, we assume that they
have correct forecasts how a tax change would influence the next period inflation rate
if it happened (which we are going to use for estimating the transition matrix). The
forecasting error pi – incorporating errors resulting from ignoring the whole price dis-
tribution – is assumed to be orthogonal to the regressors.
Given this forecasted inflation rate, the forecast for the sectoral output growth gfYs(t)
is given by
gfYs(t) = gPY − pifs (t), (25)
and the sectoral cost parameter ζfs (t) is
log ζfs (t) = log ζs(t− 1) +
1
η
gfYs(t)−
1
η
gZs(t) + g
f
w(t), g
f
w =
ψ
η
(
gfY (t)− gZ(t)
)
. (26)
The estimate for the expected wage growth uses the approximate result logL(t) ∼
ψ
η (log Y (t) − logZ(t)) using the individual labor demand (13) and the labor supply
equation (6).
3. Aggregate nominal output level, and thereby sectoral nominal demand follows the pro-
cess
log(P (t+ 1)Y (t+ 1)) = log(P (t)Y (t)) + gPY , (27)
where gPY is an exogenously given constant. The assumption substantially simpli-
fies the analysis, allowing the paper to focus on firm level and sectoral incentives for
responding to tax changes.
4. Market clearing in all the goods market Csi(t) = Ysi(t),
5. Assets in zero net supply: B(t) = 0,
6. Equilibrium in the sectoral labor markets implying sectoral wages ws equating sectoral
labor demand and labor supply.
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2.5 Flexible-price equilibrium
If the menu cost is zero, then nothing prevents stores from re-optimizing their price each
month. In this case, there is an analytical solution of the model, which serves as a benchmark
for the menu cost case.10
Solving the firms’ profit maximization problem, it is easy to derive that the optimal
relative price is
p∗i (t) =
(
θζ (t)
θ − 1
1 + τi (t)
ηAi(t)1/η
) η
θ+η−θη
, (28)
with ζ (t) = w(t)
(
nη−1C(t)
Z(t)
) 1
η
, and w (t) = w˜(t)P (t)C(t) being the normalized nominal wage.
Then the optimal relative consumptions are C
∗
i (t)
C(t)/n = p
∗
i (t)
−θ, which implies
C∗i (t) =
(
C(t)
n
) η−θη
θ+η−θη
Z(t)
θ
θ+η−θη
(
θnw(t)
(θ − 1)η
) −θη
θ+η−θη
(
1 + τi(t)
Ai(t)1/η
) −θη
θ+η−θη
. (29)
Aggregating these with the CES-aggregator C(t) =
[∑
i n
−1
θ Ci(t)
θ−1
θ
] θ
θ−1
, we can derive
that
(θ − 1) η
θζ(t)
=
[∑
i
n−1
(
1 + τi(t)
Ai(t)1/η
) η−θη
θ+η−θη
] θ+η−θη
η−θη
≡ 1 + τ(t), (30)
where the summation is a CES-aggregate of individual ”effective” tax rates 1+τi(t)
Ai(t)1/η
, denoted
as an average tax rate 1 + τ(t).
With this average tax rate we can write the optimal individual relative prices as
p∗i (t) =
[
(1 + τi(t)) /Ai(t)1/η
1 + τ(t)
] η
θ+η−θη
, (31)
and relative outputs as
C∗i (t)
C∗(t)/n
=
[
(1 + τi(t)) /Ai(t)1/η
1 + τ(t)
] −θη
θ+η−θη
(32)
which says that the optimal relative prices and relative outputs are determined by the relative
effective tax rates (i.e. the ratio of the individual effective tax rates 1+τi(t)
Ai(t)1/η
and the average
tax rate 1 + τ(t)).
The wage rate will be determined on the labor market by making labor demand and
supply equal. Labor supply can be derived from the consumers’ maximization problem.
Rewriting equation (6) leads to
L(t) =
(
w˜(t)
µP (t)C(t)
) 1
ψ
=
(
w(t)
µ
) 1
ψ
, (33)
10Sectoral subscripts s are suppressed for notational convenience.
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while the labor demand equation (13) can be written in this way:
Li(t) =
(
C∗i (t)
Z(t)Ai(t)
) 1
η
=
(θ − 1) η
θnw(t) [1 + τ(t)]Ai(t)1/η
[
(1 + τi(t)) /Ai(t)1/η
1 + τ(t)
] −θ
θ+η−θη
. (34)
Aggregate labor demand is the sum of individual demands. A little algebra shows that the
equilibrium wage rate is
w(t) = µ
1
1+ψ
(
(θ − 1)η
θ
) ψ
1+ψ
∑
i
1
1 + τi(t)
n−1
[
(1 + τi(t)) /Ai(t)1/η
] η−θη
θ+η−θη
[1 + τ(t)]
η−θη
θ+η−θη

ψ
1+ψ
, (35)
where the last term is a weighted average of 11+τi(t) -s (the weights sum to 1 by the
definition of 1 + τ(t) in equation (30)), and can therefore be written as another average of
individual tax rates: 11+τ˜(t) . Therefore the equilibrium wage rate is simply
w(t) = µ
1
1+ψ
(
(θ − 1)η
θ (1 + τ˜(t))
) ψ
1+ψ
, (36)
a function of deep parameters and individual tax rates.
With this equilibrium wage we can derive the level of individual outputs and prices.
Rearranging the aggregation equation (30), we can write w(t)
(
nη−1C(t)
Z(t)
) 1
η
= ζ(t) = (θ−1)ηθ[1+τ(t)] ,
which implies that the real GDP path is
C∗(t) = nZ(t)
(
(θ − 1)η
θnw(t) [1 + τ(t)]
)η
≈ n1−ηZ(t)
(
(θ − 1)η
θµ [1 + τ(t)]
) η
1+ψ
, (37)
(where we used the approximation 1+τ(t) ≈ 1+ τ˜(t)), which is again a function of model
parameters and exogenous variables. The aggregate price level is the ratio of the nominal
GDP (which is exogenous) and the real GDP:
P ∗(t) = GDP (t)/C∗(t) ≈ nη−1 1
Z(t)
(
θµ [1 + τ(t)]
(θ − 1)η
) η
1+ψ
. (38)
Then the expected growth rates can be calculated easily. From the wage equation (36),
we have
E (gw) = − ψ1 + ψE (g1+τ˜ ) ≈ −
ψ
1 + ψ
E (g1+τ ) . (39)
From the real GDP-equation (37), it follows that
E (gY ) = E (gC) ≈ E (gZ)− η1 + ψE (g1+τ ) . (40)
Finally, from the price level equation (38), inflation is the difference between the nominal
GDP-growth (gPY , given exogeneously) and real GDP-growth:
E (pi) = E (gP ) = gPY − E (gY ) = gPY − E (gZ) + η1 + ψE (g1+τ ) . (41)
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Observe that the pass-through of tax changes into inflation is influenced by two deep
parameters in this model. Consider a tax increase. On the one hand, a lower η (returns
to scale parameter in the production function) decreases the pass-through to inflation by
decreasing the extent of fall in the growth rate of real GDP (and the nominal GDP growth
is given exogeneously). On the other hand, a lower ψ (inverse of the labor supply elasticity)
increases the pass-through through the following channel: higher labor supply elasticity leads
to larger drop in equilibrium working hours and output, so the inflation effect will be higher
(again assuming constant nominal GDP-growth).
Note also that in the absence of menu costs, there is no asymmetry in the pass-through
after tax increases and decreases. Also, these equations imply that without tax changes, real
GDP-growth and inflation are determined by the growth rate of the aggregate technology
shock Z(t).
2.6 Model solution with menu costs
The model with menu cost does not have a closed form solution, so we are going to solve it
numerically. As the problem involves discrete choices resulting in kinks in the policy function,
we are using value function iteration over a discretized state space for the solution.11
To obtain a transition matrix Paggr over the aggregate state variables (pis, ζs, gZ , τ1, τ2, φ)
determining the probabilities of a state next period as a function of the current state, we are
going to build a VAR system describing the firms’ forecasts. The VAR is of the form:

pifs (t+ 1)
log ζfs (t+ 1)
gZs(t+ 1)
log τ1(t+ 1)
log τ2(t+ 1)
φ(t+ 1)
 = A0 +A1 ·

pis(t)
log ζs(t)
gZs(t)
log τ1(t)
log τ2(t)
φ(t)
+ Ξ ·

pis(t+ 1)
gZs(t+ 1)
gτ1(t+ 1)
gτ2(t+ 1)
g+τ¯ (t+ 1)
g−τ¯ (t+ 1)
∆φ(t+ 1)

(42)
To obtain the parameters for this VAR system, the algorithm guesses inital parameters
(γ1, γ2, γ3, γ4 γ5, γ6) of the inflation forecasting equation (24) using the flexible price solution.
From this, it obtains a forecast for the ζf (t+ 1) using equation (26). Forecast for gZs(t+ 1)
is determined by equation (11) and the development of the tax rates (τ1, τ2) is simulated
exogenously and from this gτ1 , gτ2 , g+τ¯ , g
−
τ¯ are obtained. The transition matrix is obtained by
simulating 5000 shocks for each element of the current aggregate state space and obtaining
the percentages of getting into next period states. The transition matrix for the idiosyncratic
technology level PA was similarly obtained by the one variable method suggested by Tauchen
(1986).
The initial guess for the value function is obtained using the flexible price equilibrium,
and then it is iterated using the transition matrices Paggr, PA until convergence. From the
value functions, we obtain the policy functions determining the states the firm is willing to
change its price PC/NC and the level of new relative price in case of price change PC . Using
the policy functions, we simulate price developments of 2000 firms for 2000 periods. The
11In the baseline model, the state variables (psi, Asi, pis, ζs, gZs, τ
1, τ2, φ) have (100, 29, 7, 7, 3, 2, 2, 2) grids
respectively.
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firms within a sector are partitioned between those facing τ1 and τ2 tax rates according to
the sectoral CPI weights.
We obtain the aggregate state variables from this simulated sample. The model assumes
that the firms know the current exogenous and endogenous state variables, including the
current sectoral inflation rate pis which is influenced by the current decisions of the firms. To
model this, we are choosing the inflation rate every period as the grid-point which ensures
that the guess of the firms for current inflation rate pics and the resulting inflation rate pis
are the closest. The wage rate required to calculate the current sectoral cost factor ζs is
obtained by equating the simulated labor demand to the simulated labor supply. Using these
aggregate variables, we run an OLS regression of the forecasting equation (24) obtaining new
estimates for γ. We are running the algorithm until the guessed and obtained parameters in
the forecasting equation are sufficiently close to each other.
3 Data
We estimate the model and the effect of various value-added tax changes on a data set
containing store-level price quotes. These data are originally used to the monthly calculation
of the Consumer Price Index in Hungary.
The data set contains price quotes between December 2001 and December 2006, which
enables us to observe the frequency and magnitude of price changes in 60 consecutive months.
In terms of product categories, we have price information about 770 different representative
items; the total CPI-weight of these items is 70.12% in 2006. The missing representative items
are mainly regulated prices, or in some cases methodological problems make it impossible to
collect data from different stores (e.g. used cars, computers).
After an initial data analysis, we dropped another 220 representative items, so finally
we ended up with 550 representative items with a total CPI-weight of approximately 45.3%.
Among these excluded items there are the fuels, alcoholic beverages and tobacco, where fre-
quent changes in oil prices, and/or frequent indirect tax changes make it difficult to estimate
the effect of value-added tax changes. Another reason of these exclusions was that for these
representative items the maximum length of price spells were constrained. This could be
because the Central Statistical Office began data collection about these products at a later
date. (Examples are LCD TV-s, memory cards, MP3 players etc.) The other typical reason
of exclusion was seasonal data collection: for some products (cherries, gloves, skis etc) the
statistical office collects price quotes only in certain, pre-specified months of the year. All
in all, this way we ensured that the maximum length of the observed price spells exceeds 36
months (3 years) for each representative item, which we regard long enough to get reliable
estimates. The sample coverage (in 2006) by main CPI-categories is illustrated in Table 112.
These 550 representative items in the data set can be regarded as 550 mini panels, con-
taining time series of price quotes from different outlets. As an example, consider item 10001
”Bony pork rib with tenderloin”: the data set contains 7,922 observations from 162 different
outlets, i.e. 48.9 price quotes per outlet. Moreover, for 96 of the 162 stores we have data for
each month. As it is true for most of the representative items in the data set that the list
12The single ’Energy’ item (propan-butan gas) remaining after the exclusions is included in the ’Other
goods’ category
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Table 1: Coverage of the data set by CPI-categories
CPI basket Original sample Final sample
CPI category Weight Items Weight Items Weight Items
Food, alcohol, tobacco 31.842 222 31.322 220 20.272 162
Unprocessed food 5.665 53 5.665 53 4.151 34
Processed food 26.177 169 25.657 167 16.121 128
Proc. food excl. alc, tob 17.427 139 16.907 137 16.121 128
Clothing 5.305 171 5.305 171 3.147 101
Durable goods 9.240 112 4.976 73 3.562 49
Other goods 15.277 214 12.979 192 7.852 159
Energy 13.203 16 6.350 8 0.723 1
Services 25.134 161 14.679 106 9.789 78
TOTAL 100.000 896 70.122 770 45.346 550
Table 2: VAT rates in Hungary
VAT-rates in Hungary Lower Middle Top
– Dec 31, 2003 0% 12% 25%
Jan 1, 2004 – Dec 31, 2005 5% 15% 25%
Jan 1, 2006 – Aug 31, 2006 5% 15% 20%
Sep 1, 2006 – 5% 20% 20%
of observed outlets is typically unchanged, the data is appropriate to investigate store-level
developments in the prices, and also the pricing behavior of different stores.
On average, there are approximately 6,566 observations per representative item in the
data set, which means that the total number of observations exceeds 3.6 million (3,611,335).
Our analysis will focus on regular prices, rather than sales prices. The price collectors
of the Central Statistical Office use a sales flag to identify sales prices (i.e. prices that are
temporarily low, and have a ”sales” label), and we use these flags to filter out sales prices in
the first round. After this we also filter out any remaining price changes that are (1) at least
10 %, (2) and are completely reversed within 2 months.
3.1 Inflation effects of VAT-changes
Individual products in Hungary are categorized into 3 distinct groups and face 3 distinct VAT
tax rates. There are only a few products with extra subsidy (drugs, school books) facing
the lowest tax rates. As these products only constitute 2.1% in CPI-weights of our sample,
we will ignore these. The two other categories constitute the 46.8% and 51% of our sample.
Table 2 presents the changes in the various tax rates. In January 2004 the middle rate was
increased from 12% to 15%, and this same rate was increased again in September 2006 from
15% to 20%. The top rate, meanwhile was decreased in January 2006 from 25% to 20%. Ex
post, the tax changes can be seen as a stepwise convergence of the middle and the top tax
rates, though this outcome was not explicitly expressed ex ante by the fiscal authorities.
To estimate the inflation effect of these VAT-changes, Gabriel-Reiff (2007) decompose
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the inflation process into frequency and size effects. The starting point of this decomposition
is the following identity: pi = fr+µ+ − fr−µ−, where fr+ and fr− are frequencies of
price increases and price decreases, and µ+ and µ− are average sizes of price increases and
decreases (see Tables 2 and 3). Then VAT-changes influence the inflation rate through these
four components.
Gabriel-Reiff (2007) estimate the effect of VAT-changes for all of these four components
separately. To account for possible sectoral heterogeneities, they go to the sectoral level
(representative items) and estimate the inflation effects of VAT-changes for each sector sep-
arately. Then they aggregate the sectoral inflation effects with the CPI-weights to obtain an
overall inflation effect.
The main finding of Gabriel-Reiff (2007) is that VAT-increases and -decreases have very
asymmetric effects on inflation (see Table 3). While the 2004 January VAT-increase (from
12% to 15%) and the 2006 September VAT-increase (from 15% to 20%) have increased the
price level by 1.17% and 2.13%, respectively, after the 2006 January VAT-decrease (from
25% to 20%) the price level declined by only 0.92%. While some of these differences may
be explained by the different sectoral decomposition of the affected items by the different
VAT-changes, the differences still remain significant in those sectors when some items were
affected by the VAT-increases, and some items were affected by the VAT-decrease (processed
food and services).
Table 3: Inflation effects of VAT-changes
CPI 2004 Jan 2006 Jan 2006 Sep
CPI category weight price effect price effect price effect
Unprocessed food 4.151 2.12% -0.54% 4.37%
Processed food 16.121 2.10% -0.88% 3.30%
Clothing 3.147 0.17% -1.22% -0.03%
Durable goods 3.562 0.35% -1.88% 0.46%
Other goods 8.575 0.45% -1.25% 0.95%
Services 9.789 0.49% -0.42% 1.58%
TOTAL 45.346 1.17% -0.92% 2.13%
Gabriel-Reiff (2007) also investigate the main channel of price adjustment after the VAT-
shocks. Their results indicate that adjustment mostly takes place through the ”primary
channel”: after a VAT-increase, for example, adjustment is mainly driven by the stores’
increasing willingness to increase prices, rather than by their decreasing willingness to de-
crease prices. Similarly, after a VAT-decrease most of the adjustment takes place through
the outlets’ increasing willingness to decrease prices.
Gabriel-Reiff also observe that the price of those products that are not directly affected
by the VAT-changes may also change. They report that at the 2004 January and 2006
September VAT-increases the price level of non-affected items also increased by an average of
0.39% and 0.72%, and similarly, at the 2006 January VAT-decrease the price level of the non-
affected items fell by 0.60%. In all cases, the biggest effect can be observed in those sectors
where there are many close substitutes among the affected and non-affected products. (An
example is cakes with and without chocolates in the processed food sector: cakes without
chocolates were affected by the VAT-increases, while the cakes with chocolates were affected
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by the VAT-decrease.) This may hint that one should focus on relative rather than absolute
tax rates when investigating price developments.
3.2 Data moments
We estimate model parameters by matching some data moments. This means that for an
arbitrary combination of model parameters, we solve the model, simulate hypothetical data,
calculate the moments, and compare them with the same moments estimated from data. We
will obtain the estimated model parameters by matching these ”theoretical moments” to the
true ”data moments”.
At the heart of this procedure is the choice of moments, upon which the matching is
based. Our choice is similar – though not identical – to the one by Klenow-Willis (2006), as
we also use some extra moments to account for the tax changes:
• mean sectoral monthly inflation rate;
• (time-series) standard deviation of sectoral monthly inflation rate;
• frequency of price changes;
• average size of price changes;
• autocorrelation of new relative prices;
• inflation effect of value-added tax increases and decreases.
To describe the calculation of the mean sectoral monthly inflation rate, let us introduce
some notation. We index time by t, representative items by s, and stores by i. Then the
mean sectoral (i.e. representative item-level) inflation rate is
pist =
∑
i
logPsit − logPsi,t−1
Ni
, (43)
where Ni is the number of stores observed both at time t and time t− 1 in sector (represen-
tative item) s. From these we calculate average monthly inflation rates for the representative
items by time aggregation:
pis =
∑
t
pist
T
, (44)
and finally the mean monthly inflation rate for the whole economy (or broader CPI-categories)
is obtained by aggregating over representative items:
pi =
∑
s
wspis, (45)
where ws are CPI-weights (we use the CPI-weights in 2006). Note that seasonal variation in
monthly inflation rates does not affect our estimates as we are using price changes between
January 2002 - December 2006 to calculate mean representative item-level inflation rates.
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The time-series standard deviation of sectoral monthly inflation rates is calculated sim-
ilarly. First we calculate the time-series standard deviation of pist for each representative
item:
σ2s =
∑
t
(pist − pis)2
T − 1 , (46)
and then calculate the weighted average of these across representative items:
σ =
∑
s
wsσs. (47)
As our theoretical model does not contain any seasonal variation, we calculate these measures
on the seasonally adjusted pist series (i.e. we subtract the estimated seasonal dummies).
The third moment that we use for matching is the frequency of price changes. These are
again calculated at the representative item-level, and then aggregated across representative
items:
Is =
∑
t
∑
i
I (∆Psit 6= 0)
Ns
, (48)
where I (∆Psit 6= 0) is a dummy for price changes, and Ns is the total number of observations
for representative item s. The overall average frequency is then
I =
∑
s
wsIs. (49)
Again, seasonal variation in frequencies does not bias our frequency estimates as we use price
change data between January 2002 - December 2006 for the frequency calculations.
The average size of price changes is calculated first at the representative item level:
∆Ps =
∑
I(∆Psit 6=0)
|∆Psit|
NIs
, (50)
whereNIs is the total number of price changes for representative item s:
∑
t
∑
i I (∆Psit 6= 0).
Then the average size across representative items is
∆P =
∑
s
ws∆Ps. (51)
Our fifth moment, the autocorrelation of new relative prices is taken from Klenow-Willis
(2006) to calibrate the persistence of idiosyncratic shocks the hit the stores. To calculate this,
we first obtain relative prices. Firm i’s relative price in sector s is psit = logPsit − logP st,
where P st =
∑
i Psit/Ni is the average price at time t. We consider all relative prices that
are newly set, and calculate the autocorrelation between these newly set relative prices at
the store level:
ρp,s,i =
∑
I(∆Psit 6=0) (log psit − log psit) (log psi,t−τsit − log psit)∑
I(∆Psit 6=0) (log psit − log psit)
2 , (52)
where psit is the average of newly set relative prices, and τsit is the time (in months) between
the previous and current price change. The autocorrelation at the representative item level
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is the average of ρp,s,i-s across stores: ρp,s =
∑
i
ρp,s,i/Ni, while the overall autocorrelation
of newly set relative prices is
ρp =
∑
s
wsρp,s. (53)
Finally, we also control for the inflation effect of the value-added tax increases and de-
creases. To be consistent with the model simulations, where we calculate these VAT-effects
from time-series data, we also calculated these inflation effects from time-series data.13 Specif-
ically, we estimated the following time-series regression for each representative item:
pist = β0 +
11∑
k=1
βk(MONTH = k)t + β12V AT04Jt + β13V AT06Jt + β14V AT06St + εt, (54)
where the explanatory variables are month dummies, and other dummies corresponding to
value-added tax changes. So the inflation effect of the various value-added tax changes are
estimated by
(
β̂12, β̂13, β̂14
)
, and the overall inflation effects are∑
s
wsβ̂12,s,
∑
s
wsβ̂13,s,
∑
s
wsβ̂14,s. (55)
Klenow-Willis (2006) use another moment (standard deviation of new relative prices,
σp) which we do not use. This is because we use the average size of price changes as a
matching moment, which has similar information content with the standard deviation of
new relative prices: they are both closely related to the variance of idiosyncratic technology
shocks. Nevertheless, we will compare the value of σp in the model and in our data, to test
the goodness of the estimates. Following Klenow-Willis (2006), we calculate σp similarly to
ρp:
σp,s,i =
∑
I(∆Psit 6=0) (log psit − log psit)
2∑
t I (∆Psit 6= 0)
,
then at the representative item level σp,s =
∑
i σp,s,i/Ni, and at the aggregate level
σp =
∑
s
wsσp,s.
3.3 Stylized Facts
This section presents some qualitative statements obtained from observation of the data and
its moments. The first couple of stylized facts are about the development of the moments
during ’normal’ times. It claims that the prices in terms of their major moments behave very
similarly as was found in numerous studies using CPI data. It emphasizes the heterogeneity
across sectors and shows that the price increases are more frequent, but on average smaller
in size than the price decreases.
13The VAT effects calculated by Gabriel-Reiff, 2007 using panel estimations and the (averaged) time-series
method we are using do not necessarily imply the same results, but as it can be seen by comparing Tables 3
and 4 they are sufficiently close to each other
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The second part of the section presents the stylized facts about the development of major
moments as a response to the tax changes. Other than emphasizing the asymmetry of infla-
tion effects, the section shows that the fraction of the price changing firms clearly increased
as a result of the tax shocks supporting ’state-dependent’ pricing models, and is clearly
smaller than 1 even in the subsample of directly affected products contrary to predictions of
a frictionless, flexible price model. It also presents the result that the absolute magnitude of
average price-changes decreases as a result of the tax shocks.
3.3.1 Stable frequency and large average absolute size of price changes.
Figure 2 and 3 show the fraction of firms changing prices and the magnitude of average price
changes respectively in our sample. The average frequency of price change is fairly stable
around the average (12%) level during ’normal’ times in line with findings of previous studies
(see e.g. Klenow and Krystov, 2007). Its relatively low level can be explained by the fact
that some sectors with very flexible prices (e.g. fuel) were excluded from the sample (with
these sectors the average frequency is 18.5%). The average absolute size of the price changes
during ’normal’ times – also in line with other studies – is high: it fluctuates around its
average of 11.5%.
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Figure 2: Frequency of price changes
3.3.2 Price increases are more frequent, but smaller than price decreases
Figures 2 and 3 also present the fraction of price increasing and price decreasing firms as well
as the average absolute size of price increases and decreases. They show that the fraction
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Figure 3: Average absolute size of price changes
of price increasing firms are consistently higher (7.7% on average) than the fraction of price
decreasing firms (4.3%). As a mirror image of this fact, the average absolute size of price
increases are consistently lower (10.2%) than those of the price decreases (12.4%).
3.3.3 There is a large sectoral heterogeneity
Table 4 reports the calculated moments for the main CPI-categories for each examined sec-
tors, with frequency and sizes calculated for ’normal’ non-tax change months and tax change
months as well. We can interpret these figures as moments calculated from a ”typical” rep-
resentative item in the respective CPI-categories. The model parameters are about to be
calibrated to for each CPI-category to match these typical representative items.
Table 4: Estimated data moments
CPI category pi σ INT IT ∆PNT ∆PT ρp
Proc. food 0.429% 0.91% 0.134 0.529 0.099 0.088 0.010
Unproc. food 0.282% 2.64% 0.322 0.640 0.116 0.111 0.230
Clothing -0.119% 0.63% 0.065 0.089 0.157 0.137 -0.123
Durable goods -0.260% 0.51% 0.088 0.130 0.100 0.093 -0.100
Other goods 0.125% 0.62% 0.094 0.2 0.110 0.105 -0.076
Services 0.699% 0.67% 0.063 0.252 0.138 0.111 -0.031
All 0.324% 0.91% 0.120 0.356 0.115 0.102 -0.013
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Table 4 shows that both in terms of the sectoral inflation rates and price rigidities the
sectors show sizable heterogeneity. The two largest sectors affected by all of the tax changes
(the processed food and the services sectors) are also different: the services sector facing
higher inflation rate and higher price rigidity than the processed food sector.
3.3.4 The inflation effects are asymmetric
Table 5 presents the estimated VAT effects for each sectors. As the relative weights of
products facing the middle and top tax rates are different across sectors (see the columns
’middle’ and ’top’), the overall inflation effects calculated from the regressions 54 are not
directly comparable. We can, however, compute the inflation effect of a unit tax increase
which is directly comparable (presented in the last three columns of Table 5) and calculated
by dividing the overall effect by change in the average sectoral tax rate. Comparing the
effects of the 2006 January 5% tax decrease and the 2006 September 5% tax increase shows
the magnitude of the asymmetry this paper is about to explain.
Table 5: Estimated VAT effects
CPI category CPI weights Overall Unit
middle top VAT04j VAT06j VAT06s VAT04j VAT06j VAT06s
Proc. food 78.8% 21.2% 1.660 -0.770 3.471 0.810 0.839 1.044
Unproc. food 100% 0% 1.150 -0.137 4.724 0.435 NA 1.11
Clothing 1% 99% 0.211 -1.085 0.212 NA 0.268 NA
Durable goods 0% 100% 0.118 -1.661 0.602 NA 0.407 NA
Other goods 17.8% 82.1% 0.436 -1.032 0.881 0.986 0.303 1.203
Services 32.1% 67.9% 0.495 -0.848 1.413 0.615 0.299 1.06
All 47.9% 52.1% 0.909 -0.870 2.200 0.748 0.395 1.104
3.3.5 Frequency increases, size decreases during VAT shocks
The fraction of firms changing prices clearly increases (31.4% from 13%) in the months of the
tax changes, as it can be seen in Figure 2, in line with international evidence (see Gagnon,
2007 and the references there.) It should be noted, however, that the frequency of price
changing firms is strictly less than 1 even in the subsamples of directly affected firms (around
60%) providing some evidence against fully flexible price setting.
The average size of price changes during the months of tax changes decreases (from 11.5%
to 10.2%) as it can be seen in Figure 3. The systematic nature of this outcome is underlined
by the fact that it is also true in all of the sectors, as Table 4 shows.
4 Calibration Results
The parameters are set to hit some important moments of the data, and our main interest
is whether the model is able to explain the (asymmetric) response of the inflation rate to
the tax changes. We going to present 3 estimates: the first ignores sectoral heterogeneity
and estimates the model on the aggregate data, while the other 2 estimates the model on
21
Peter Karadi – Adam Reiff: Menu Costs and Inflation Asymmetries
the processed food and the services sectors. These two sectors are the largest in our sample
– 16.1% and 9.8% overall CPI weights – including products facing both tax rates. Our
estimations imply that the major difference between the sectors is the level of their trend
inflation rate and it is the main reason for their different responses to the tax shocks: while
the asymmetry between a unit tax increase and tax decrease in the processed food sector is
only marginally significant, the services sector shows significantly higher inflation effect of a
unit tax increase.
4.1 Parametrization
We calibrate the model parameters by fitting simulated moments to some of the observed
sectoral characteristics of the data. Some of the parameters are fixed exogenously. We
calibrate β = 0.961/12, and the mean aggregate nominal growth rate to gPY = 0.0934 ·(1/12),
which is the average monthly growth in Hungary over the period 2002:01-2006:12. The
persistence of the aggregate technology shock is set to ρgZ = 0.7.
We set the value of θ determining the level of competition within a sector to 11, which is a
usual number used in the macro literature implying a 10% markup. Choosing a relatively high
value for this variable (in the industrial organization literature a θ ≈ 4 is more common) is
also justified by the fact that Devereux and Siu, 2007 predicts stronger strategic asymmetry
in case of high θ. The choice of θ determines the asymmetry of the profit and the value
functions, thereby influences the relative frequency and the size of the price increases and
decreases. The fact that model is fairly successful in hitting these moments provides support
for the chosen magnitude of θ.
In this version of the paper, we set η = 1 implying constant returns to scale. Examining
the case with η < 1 is an interesting avenue for further research, as it would imply steeper
and more convex cost function making the firms more sensitive to the demand effects, so we
can expect the strategic consideration based on demand effects to be stronger.
The other parameters of the model are calibrated to match some important sectoral
pricing characteristics. The mean of the sectoral technology growth µgZ is calibrated to
make the simulated inflation rate equal to the mean sectoral inflation p¯i. Other parameters
do not have a clear one-to-one relationship between one moments, but we have good idea
how they influence the moments we would like to hit. The standard deviation of the sectoral
technology growth σgZ increases the estimated average standard deviation of the inflation
rate σp¯i, the frequency and marginally the size of the price changes. The persistence of the
(logarithm of the) idiosyncratic technology shock ρA increases the persistence of the relative
price developments ρp and its standard deviation σA increases the frequency, the size of the
price changes and the standard deviation of the relative prices σp. The menu costs φ decreases
the frequency and increases the size of the price changes. The labor supply elasticity 1/ψ
influences the inflation effects of the tax changes, as it influences how much of its effect is
buffered by the relative wage and thereby the cost adjustment. Higher labor supply elasticity
(lower ψ) implies lower wage response, thereby higher inflation effects of the tax change. The
labor-utility parameter µ is calibrated in each sector to set the aggregate labor supply equal
to 1/3.
So to sum up, we have 8 ’moving’ parameters (µgZ , σgZ , ρA, σA, φNT , φT , ψ, µ) and we use
them to hit 8 major moments (we call them ’matched moments’) of the data (p¯i, σp¯i, ρp, I¯NT , I¯T ,
∆PNT , L¯, p¯iT ), where the subscripts NT and T refer to averages during ’normal’ times and tax
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shocks respectively, L¯ is the sectoral labor supply (equal to the third of the sector CPI-share),
and the p¯iT is the average inflation effects of the tax changes. Other moments of the data
can be used to evaluate the performance of the model (we call them ’unmatched moments’),
and these are the effects of the positive and negative unit tax changes (γ±), the standard
deviation of the relative prices σp, the average size of price changes during the months of the
tax changes ∆PT , and the frequency and the size of price increases and decreases (I¯±,∆P±).
4.2 Results
Table 6 presents the parameters for each calibrations (aggregate, processed food and services)
and the estimated forecasting equations with the resulting goodness of fit parameters. Table
7 presents the values of the moments which were directly used for the calibration (’matched
moments’) and the values of the ’unmatched’ moments.
The forecasting equations show that the estimated parameters of the state variables in
equation (24) are in most cases significant and are able to explain 50%, 78% and 60% of the
variance of the inflation rate in the aggregate, processed food and services sector calibrations
respectively. These results imply that using higher order moments might be justified for the
forecasting equation. It should be noted however, that as we assume that firms know the
current value of inflation rate when choosing current prices, the forecasting equation can be
expected to have only limited effects on their decision, so adding new variables and obtaining
better fit can be expected to have limited effect on our results.
4.2.1 The model is successful at hitting major moments during ’normal’ times
The results show that the model is fairly good at hitting most of the moments representing
’normal times’ for both the aggregate and the sectoral calibrations.
Looking at the aggregate calibration, the overall frequency of price change during ’normal
times’ is 12.0% and the size of the price changes is 11.5% which are somewhat different from
those found in the CPI data in other countries 14 showing that our sample overrepresents
sectors with less price flexibility (we have excluded energy, alcohol and tobacco for example).
Similarly to previous menu cost models with idiosyncratic shocks, the model needs idiosyn-
cratic shocks with large unconditional standard deviation (σuA =
σA√
1−ρA2 = 6.5%) to be able
to hit the large average size and frequency of the price changes.
The menu cost in case of no tax change is estimated to be 5.5% when paid, but note
that it is only paid in case of price change which – under no tax change – happens with
12% probability. It means that the yearly menu cost proportional to the firms’ revenue is
estimated to be 0.66%, which is within the range of estimated menu cost levels in previous
studies (Klenow-Willis, 2006 estimates a yearly cost of 1.4%, while Nakamura-Steinsson, 2007
finds this measure to be 0.2%).
The sectoral estimations can also be considered successful at hitting the major moments.
The major difference between the two sectors is that the services sector faces both higher
yearly trend inflation (8.7% compared to 4.9%) and higher estimated menu costs (11% com-
pared to 3.8%15) than the processed food sector. These differences can fully explain both
14Nakamura and Steinsson, 2007, for example, reports median frequency of 21.1% and size at 8.5% for the
US data
15Implying reasonable 0.69% and 0.5% yearly menu costs
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Table 6: Calibrations
Parameters Aggr. Food Services
σgZ Std. dev. of sectoral technology growth 10% 6% 1.3%
ρA AR. parameter of the idiosyncratic shocks 0.600 0.675 0.35
σA Std. dev. of idiosyncratic shocks 5.2% 4.5% 6%
φNT Menu costs during ’normal’ times 5.5% 3.8% 11%
φT Menu costs during tax changes 2.7% 1.4% 4.1%
ψ Inverse of the Frisch elasticity of labor supply 1 0 0.1
µ Utility weight of the labor supply 7 6.75 13
Forecast of pis(t+ 1) as a function of Aggr. Food Services
γ1 Constant 0.014 0.008 0.013
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
γ2 Current inflation pis(t) 0.017 0.031 0.014
(0.022) (0.012) (0.015)
γ3 Cost parameter ξs(t) 0.033 0.007 0.025
(0.005) (0.006) (0.006)
γ4 Technology growth gZs(t) -.615 -.692 -.544
(0.029) (0.024) (0.09)
γ5 Positive average tax growth g
+
τ¯ (t+ 1) 0.533 0.882 0.882
(0.032) (0.002) (0.019)
γ6 Negative average tax growth g
−
τ¯ (t+ 1) 0.622 0.820 0.367
(0.034) (0.02) (0.02)
R2 Goodness of fit 50% 78% 60%
the substantially lower fraction of price changing firms in the services sector (6.3% compared
to 13.3%) and the substantially higher average absolute size of price changes in the services
sector (13.8% compared to 9.9%) than in the processed food sector. The calibrations imply
fairly similar unconditional idiosyncratic standard errors (σuA being 6.4% and 6.1% in the
services and processed food sectors respectively).
The variance of the relative prices σp is the moment which is significantly missed in all
calibrations. It seems to be a systematic weakness of the model appearing in all the presented
estimation: when the model is parameterized to hit the average size of price changes, it
underestimates the relative price variation. The model, on the other hand, is fairly successful
at quantitatively hitting the frequencies and the sizes of price increases and price decreases. It
suggests that the level of asymmetry in the profit and value function inherent in the standard
CES framework, and the chosen relatively high elasticity of substitution parameter (θ = 11)
is a valid choice.
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Table 7: Moments
Matched Moments Aggr. Food Services
p¯i Average inflation rate Data 0.3% 0.4% 0.7%
Estimate 0.3% 0.4% 0.7%
σp¯i Std. dev. of inflation rate Data 0.9% 0.9% 0.7%
Estimate 0.9% 0.9% 0.7%
ρp Autocorrelation of new relative prices Data -0.013 0.01 -0.031
Estimate -0.028 0.07 0.033
I¯NT Frequency during ’normal’ times Data 12% 13.3% 6.3%
Estimate 12% 13.3% 6.3%
I¯T Frequency during tax changes Data 31.4% 40.5% 26.1%
Estimate 30% 40.2% 26.1%
∆PNT Size during ’normal’ times Data 11.4% 9.9% 13.8%
Estimate 11.5% 9.9% 13.3%
Unmatched Moments Aggr. Food Services
γ+ Inflation effect of a unit tax increase Data 1.104 1.044 1.064
Estimate 0.632 0.927 0.996
γ− Inflation effect of a unit tax decrease Data 0.394 0.839 0.300
Estimate 0.716 0.581 0.439
σp Std. dev. of relative prices Data 11.4% 9.4% 12.3%
Estimate 7.4% 6.6% 7.0%
∆PT Size during tax changes Data 10% 9.0% 11.1%
Estimate 10% 8.2% 10.9%
I¯+ Frequency of price increases Data 7.7% 8.9% 5.6%
during ’normal’ times Estimate 7.96% 8.9% 5.4%
I¯− Frequency of price decreases Data 4.3% 4.5% 0.7%
during ’normal’ times Estimate 4.1% 4.5% 0.9%
∆P+ Size of price increases Data 10.2% 9.3% 13.5%
during ’normal’ times Estimate 10.6% 9.3% 12.9%
∆P− Size of price decreases Data 12.4% 10.5% 14.5%
during ’normal’ times Estimate 12.4% 10.5% 13.9%
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4.2.2 The model implies lower menu costs during VAT shocks
Maintaining homogeneous menu costs does not seem to be unable to quantitatively match the
larger frequency and lower size of price changes during VAT shocks. As the major question
of the paper is the asymmetry of the inflation effects, in this version of the paper, we allowed,
as a shortcut, the menu cost to be lower during tax changes. This assumption allowed us
to hit both the frequency and the size of price changes, and the fact that setting the menu
cost to hit the frequency of price changes during tax changes (I¯T ) is able to hit the average
absolute size of price changes ∆PT as shown in Table 7 provides some support for our choice
of heterogeneous menu costs.
For the aggregate estimations the menu cost (when paid) is estimated to be 2.7% (from
5.5%), while for the sectoral estimations it is 1.4% (from 3.8%) for the processed food sector
and 4.1% (from 11%) for the services sector. The size of the reductions can be given more
justifications by noting that, as Zbaracki et. al., 2004 found, the information-gathering and
decision-making costs related to price changes – which can be considered lower in case of the
tax changes – can be an order of magnitude larger (around 1.2%) than the physical costs of
price changes (0.05%) – which are the same in both cases.
4.2.3 The aggregate model misses, the sectoral model fully explains the level of
asymmetry
Although both the aggregate and the sectoral calibrations hit most of the moments, the
aggregate model significantly underestimates the observed asymmetry: it predicts a response
with (marginally) reverse asymmetry to a unit tax shock (0.632 and 0.716 respectively),
while the data shows much stronger response (1.104) to a tax increase than to the tax
decrease (0.395). A possible reason for this is that the non-sectoral model does not take
the sectoral heterogeneity into consideration. Among other things, it ignores the sectoral
inflation differences which cause different sectoral asymmetric effects. If the inflation effect
on the asymmetry is not linear, the non-sectoral model can be expected to underestimate
the asymmetry. This argument justifies the sectoral calibration of the model.
The sectoral calibrations are much more successful in hitting the asymmetric inflation
effects of the tax changes. In line with the qualitative predictions of the model, the asym-
metry is much more substantial in the services sector, which is the sector with the higher
inflation rate and lower price flexibility. The model is also successful quantitatively. In the
processed food sector the inflation effects of unit tax increases are estimated to be 1.04 and
0.84 respectively. The model underestimates the inflation effects of the tax shocks (even with
fully flexible labor supply with ψ = 0)16, and somewhat overestimates the asymmetry by
predicting coefficients with 0.93 and 0.58 respectively. In the services sector, the coefficients
of the unit tax changes are 1.06 and 0.299 respectively, and the model is very successful in
hitting these parameters by predicting 0.996 and 0.439 as coefficients for the tax increase and
decrease respectively.
16A possible reason for this is that the firms might have considered the tax changes more persistent ex ante
than in our current simulations based on the ex post tax changing frequencies.
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4.2.4 Inflation is the major reason of the sectoral asymmetry
For our parametrization, the sole economically significant reason of the observed sectoral
asymmetry is the trend inflation. Devereux and Siu, 2007 suggested that in a model similar to
ours strategic considerations should result in quantitatively important asymmetries. Running
a counterfactual experiment resulting in 0 average inflation rate, we have found no significant
asymmetry in any of the sectors. These results suggest that even with fairly high level of
competition (θ = 11), the 5%-points tax changes were not large enough to induce strategic
asymmetry.
It should be noted, though, that in this version of the paper, we assumed constant returns
to scale η = 1, and the steeper and more convex cost function implied by decreasing returns to
scale could increase the effects of this asymmetry, by making the firms’ profits more sensitive
to the demand they face. We are planning to examine this effect in later versions of the
paper.
5 Conclusion
The paper presented a sectoral menu cost model calibrated to fit some key moments of the
sectoral price development in Hungary between 2002-2006 in order to explain the observed
asymmetric inflation response to major VAT changes. The paper argued that the successful
calibration needed deviations from the homogeneous menu cost framework on the one hand,
and sectoral calibrations, on the other. The paper found that (sectoral) trend inflation can
fully account for the observed asymmetry, thereby it provided direct evidence to the argument
of Ball and Mankiw, 1994.
The present model can be used to examine the asymmetry of the monetary policy shocks
by simulating positive and negative nominal GDP level and growth shocks. By straight-
forward extensions, furthermore, it can be made able to examine the non-linearity of the
inflation effects using the 2004 January 3% point increase of the 12% VAT tax rate. The
dynamic response of inflation to the VAT shocks seems very different from a standard pro-
longed and hump shaped response to monetary shocks found in structural VAT estimations,
which can be a further interesting question for future research.
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